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Abstract
Background: Good drug regulation requires an effective system for monitoring and inspection of manufacturing 
and sales units. In India, despite widespread agreement on this principle, ongoing shortages of drug inspectors 
have been identified by national committees since 1975. The growth of India’s pharmaceutical industry and its 
large export market makes the problem more acute. 
Methods: The focus of this study is a case study of Maharashtra, which has 29% of India’s manufacturing units 
and 38% of its medicines exports. India’s regulations were reviewed, comparing international, national and state 
inspection norms with the actual number of inspectors and inspections. Twenty-six key informant interviews 
were conducted to ascertain the causes of the shortfall.
Results: In 2009-2010, 55% of the sanctioned posts of drug inspectors in Maharashtra were vacant. This resulted 
in a shortfall of 83%, based on the Mashelkar Committee’s recommendations. Less than a quarter of the required 
inspections of manufacturing and sales units were undertaken. The Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act and its 
Rules and Regulations make no provisions for drug inspectors and workforce planning norms, despite the 
growth and increasing complexity of India’s pharmaceutical industry.
Conclusion: The Maharashtra Food and Drug Administration (FDA) falls short of the Mashelkar Committee’s 
recommended workforce planning norms. Legislation and political and operational support are required to 
produce needed changes. 
Keywords: Drug Inspectors, Inspections, Drug Regulation, Manufacturing and Sales Units, Drugs and Cosmetics 
Act and Rules, Inspection Norms and Workforce Planning Norms.
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Implications for policy makers
• To assess needs and to overcome the shortage of drug inspectors, workforce planning norms need to be clarified, and governmental commitment 
to their implementation should be strengthened.
• Given the growth and complexity of the pharmaceutical industry, legal provisions may be required to ensure that adequate drug inspections 
take place.  
Implications for the public
All drug regulatory systems must have a strong inspectorate to ensure the production and distribution of safe and high-quality medicines. This study 
shows how the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act and its Rules make no provisions for drug inspectors and workforce planning norms, despite the 
growth and increasing complexity of India’s pharmaceutical industry. For example, the Maharashtra Food and Drug Administration (FDA) falls short 
of the Mashelkar Committee’s recommended workforce planning norms: oversight of the manufacturing and marketing of pharmaceuticals is weak 
at all levels. Legislation and political and operational support are required to produce much needed change. We recommend that the Central Drug 
Standard Control Organization (CDSCO) implement workforce standards and publish annually data on numbers of drug inspectors, inspections 
conducted, action against non-compliance, samples collected and tested, and substandard and spurious medicines identified at federal and state level. 
These data should be placed in the public domain to enable public scrutiny and parliamentary accountability.
Key Messages 
Background
Growth of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry and Challenges 
for Drug Regulation
In 1947, at India’s independence, pharmaceutical sales in 
India were dominated by the imports of foreign multinational 
companies, which controlled about 90% of the market. In 
1970, the Government of India implemented a series of 
initiatives to stimulate the growth of an autonomous Indian 
pharmaceutical industry. It established three new state-owned 
pharmaceutical companies, bringing the total number to five. 
It also replaced the colonial intellectual property laws codified 
in the 1911 Indian Patents and Designs Act with a new Patent 
Act, which allowed Indian companies to make generic copies 
of existing drugs if they followed a different manufacturing 
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
nd be able to mobiliz support, one needs t  represe t the
world in  conflictual manner “with opposed c mps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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process. Using ‘reverse engineering’ Indian companies began 
to produce bulk drugs at much cheaper prices than the 
originals. This shift from product patents to process patents, 
in combination with new rules that placed restrictions on the 
proportion of shares multinational companies could hold 
in Indian companies, enabled the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry to flourish.1
By 1990, India had become self-sufficient in the production 
of formulations and was close to self-sufficiency in the 
manufacture of bulk drugs. India joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1995, and in 2005 it introduced new 
laws to comply with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which re-
established the product patent regime. Today, India is a 
major producer and exporter of generic medicines with an 
estimated 10 500 pharmaceutical manufacturing units and 
approximately 600 000 sales units.2 Indian pharmaceutical 
companies produce around 60 000 generic drugs and over 
400 bulk drugs used in formulations.1 Nevertheless, its 
reputation has been tarnished by claims that it produces and 
distributes low-quality, irrational, substandard, and spurious 
medicines.3-8 In the last decade 7%-8% of drug samples tested 
in the country were found to be substandard.2 Maharashtra 
has 29% of the country’s manufacturing units and accounts 
for 38% of India’s exports of medicines.9 According to the 
annual plan report for 2011-2012 of the Medical Education 
and Drugs Department, 8% of the drug samples tested were 
deemed substandard during 2009-2010.10
In January 2012, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
issued a permanent injunction against two manufacturing 
units of the pharmaceutical giant Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. 
for their lack of compliance to Current Good Manufacturing 
Practice (CGMP).11 In 2013, the Government of India asked 
the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI) to review 
CGMP compliance of all units of Ranbaxy.12 In January 
2014, the US FDA added one more unit of Ranbaxy to its 
injunction11 despite the DCGI’s favourable national review of 
all units of Ranbaxy in 2013.
All this highlights the importance of drug inspection, quality 
monitoring and the role of drug inspectors in maintaining 
standards and ensuring trust in India’s pharmaceuticals 
production. In order to assess the capacity and quality of India’s 
inspection procedures, information concerning the approved 
drugs in the country, the number of drug inspectors, the 
number of inspections conducted and the actions in response 
to non-compliance need to be analysed. Unfortunately, these 
data are rarely available in the public domain, and indirect 
methods for analysis must be used.
Regulatory Structure in India and the Responsibilities of 
Drug Inspectors
Under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, the regulation of the 
manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs is primarily the 
concern of the State authorities (State FDAs). The Central 
Drug Standard Control Organization (CDSCO) is responsible 
for approval of new drugs, clinical trials in the country, laying 
down the standards for drugs, control over the quality of 
imported drugs, coordination of the activities of State FDAs, 
and providing expert advice to bring about uniformity in the 
enforcement of the relevant Act.13
In each state, drug inspectors are responsible for the 
inspection of all manufacturing, distribution and sales units, 
to ensure that manufacturing, sales, distribution, storage and 
dispensing of medicines proceeds according to the relevant 
rules and regulations, as amended from time to time, under 
the Drugs and Cosmetics Act of 1940, and the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Rules of 1945. Additionally, they are responsible 
for taking drug samples for testing, conducting raids, taking 
action against non-compliance, following up legal actions, 
recalling non-compliant drugs, enforcing drug price control 
orders, and regulating drug advertising and drug promotion 
(pp. 53-54).13
History of the Gap in National Statutory Provisions for 
Inspector and Workforce Norms
For more than four decades national committees have 
highlighted the shortage of drug inspectors in India. Part of 
the problem lies in the division of powers and responsibilities 
between States and the National (Central) government, 
described in the previous section.
In India, ‘the regulation of manufacture, sale and distribution 
of drugs is primarily the concern of the State authorities.’13 
Section 21 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 indicates that 
the Central Government and the State Government have the 
‘power’ but not the ‘duty’ to appoint drug inspectors. Sections 
22 and 23, respectively, provide the powers and procedures of 
inspectors. Section 33 indicates that the Central Government 
may make rules to stipulate the qualifications of inspectors. 
The Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945 indicate inspector’s 
qualifications (in Rule 49) and duties (in Rules 51 and 52). 
‘Inspection norms,’ however, are not indicated separately in 
the Act or in the Rules; they are only mentioned under duties 
of inspectors (Rules 51 and 52). Additionally, both the Act 
and the Rules lack ‘workforce planning norms’ for estimating 
the required number of drug inspectors.13
The 1975 Hathi Committee drew attention to the shortage of 
inspectors, a position which had changed little by 2003. The 
Mashelkar Committee in 2003 reported that the growth in 
the number of inspectors had not kept pace with the growth 
of the industry. At that time, there were only 935 inspectors 
nationwide. The Mashelkar Committee estimated that 1720 
drug inspectors were needed. By 2012, the 59th Parliamentary 
Standing Committee estimated a need for 3200 drug 
inspectors—many more than the 1349 sanctioned posts—
and seriously problematic in as much as only 846 of these 
sanctioned positions were actually filled (Box 1).2,14,15
Box 1 summarises the key reports and findings of government 
committees over the last four decades in respect of inadequate 
testing facilities and shortages of drug inspectors.2,14-17 The 
Government has implemented the recommendations of these 
and other committees only to a limited extent. The Working 
Group on Drugs and Food Regulation for the 12th Five Year 
Plan (2012-2017) have proposed achieving compliance with 
the Mashelkar Committee recommendations by the end of 
the Plan period.17
Lack of Both Data to Assess and Infrastructure to Perform 
Drug Inspections
National committee reviews have highlighted key concerns 
about inadequate data and infrastructure to assess needs 
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and performance and to fulfil obligations for drug 
inspections. The Mashelkar Committee Report (2003) 
and the 59th Parliamentary Standing Committee Report 
(May 2012) acknowledged the non-existence of data banks 
and lack of accurate information as problems for the drug 
regulatory system.2,15 The Indian market has a huge number 
of products, and many trade names (brand names) for 
approved formulations. CDSCO has a database of approved 
formulations but lacks a database for manufacturing licences 
issued under various trade names by the State FDAs. 
Information on the number of sanctioned posts of drug 
inspectors and the actual number of drug inspectors in the 
different states are not publicly available on the CDSCO 
website, and few of the state FDAs have their own websites. 
Essential monitoring information – such as the numbers 
of inspections conducted, actions against non-compliance, 
numbers of samples collected and tested, numbers of 
substandard and spurious medicines detected from tested 
samples – are not made available by CDSCO.
Weak infrastructure and inadequate capacity are also 
problems. Over four decades these committees have repeatedly 
drawn attention to inadequate or weak drug control 
infrastructure, including lack of manpower at CDSCO, 
inadequate testing facilities, shortage of drug inspectors, non-
uniformity of enforcement and lack of specially trained cadres 
to assess specific regulatory requirements.2,14,15,17 
With regard to inspectors and inspection systems, the 
Mashelkar Committee identified the following problems:
•	 lack of effective coordination between Centre and states
•	 slow recruitment process
•	 administrative complexities and lack of a performance 
management system 
•	 insufficient administrative, professional, and financial 
support 
•	 non-uniformity in the interpretation of laws and their 
implementation 
•	 incompetence of regulatory officials 
It also recommended time and motion studies to determine 
how much time is needed by drug inspectors for inspections, 
as well as for administrative processes, for the assessment of 
samples collected, for raids, for hearings for legal cases of 
non-compliance, and for training.
The findings of the 59th Parliamentary Standing Committee 
were similar. They highlighted the impact of inadequate 
resources and support from the Central Government.2 In 
response, the 12th 5-year plan recommended a centrally 
sponsored scheme with 60% finance provided from the 
Centre and 40% from the States.17 
This paper clarifies the context of these concerns, providing 
a brief account of the normative regulatory requirements for 
inspection, key concerns of national committees with respect 
to drug inspection, and a case study of an important State to 
analyse shortfalls in the number of inspectors, their causes, 
implications and possible solutions.
Methods
The study was undertaken as part of a larger project, Accessing 
Medicines in Africa and South Asia (AMASA), funded by the 
Box 1. Shortage of Inspectors Reported Over Four Decades
Hathi Committee report on drugs and the pharmaceutical industry, 1975 (Chapter IX, para 8)14
“… the level of enforcement in most of the States is far from satisfactory. The main reasons for this unsatisfactory state are the varying standards 
of inspection and licensing of drugs firms and the lack of qualified officers in most of the States to supervise drug control operations.”  
(This committee estimated 480 drug inspectors were required in the states against the available 369).
 
Task force appointed by Government of India, 1982 (Quoted by Mashelkar Committee Report)15
“... the number of drug inspectors in the States should be increased in keeping with the number of manufacturing and selling premises licensed.”
Lentin Commission, 1986 (page iii, para 1)16
The foreword of this report says, ‘These pages describe and illustrate the ugly facets of the human mind and human nature, projecting errors of 
judgement misuse of ministerial power and authority, apathy towards human life, corruption, nexus and quid pro quo between unscrupulous 
license holders, analytical laboratories elements in the industries department controlling the award of rate contracts, manufacturers, traders, 
merchants, suppliers, the Food and Drugs Administration and persons holding ministerial rank.’
Dr. Mashelkar Committee, 2003 (page 2, para 3)15
“… the problems in the regulatory system in the country were primarily due to inadequate or weak drug control infrastructure at the State and 
Central level, inadequate testing facilities, shortage of drug inspectors, non-uniformity of enforcement, lack of specially trained cadres for specific 
regulatory areas, non-existence of data bank and non-availability of accurate information.” 
(This committee estimated a requirement of 1720 drug inspectors in the states against the available 935).
Working Group on Drugs and Food Regulation for the 12th Five Year Plan (2012-2017) (page 8, para 1)17
“Strengthening of Drugs Regulatory Mechanisms is one of the major public health interventions. This ensures that safe, efficacious and quality 
drugs are made available to the people. Keeping in view the recommendations of the Mashelkar Committee, it is important that the infrastructure, 
both physical and human resource, both at the Centre as well as in the States is substantially augmented.”  
59th Parliamentary Standing Committee report, May 2012 (Page 18, para 2)2
“... there were approximately 600 000 retail sales outlets and around 10 500 manufacturing units in the country, which, require just over 3200 
Drugs Inspectors.  However, in reality, there were only 846 Drugs Inspectors in place against 1349 sanctioned posts in States.  Hence, the main 
problem faced by the States Drug Authorities was inadequate infrastructure, shortage of drugs inspectors, non-existence of data bank and accurate 
information....” 
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European Union Seventh Framework Programme (EU-FP7) 
(http://www.amasa-project.eu/). One of the research topics in 
the AMASA project was the study of regulatory systems and 
policies for production, quality control and distribution and 
prescribing and dispensing of medicines. In our case study, 
we examine existing national and international policies and 
regulations with respect to drug inspection in the large Indian 
state, Maharashtra, with its substantial production capacity.
Study Setting
The study was conducted in the state of Maharashtra, which is 
the location of 29% of India’s manufacturing units accounting 
for 38% of the country’s exports of medicines. It is foremost 
among the seven states that generate 75% of India’s drug 
manufacturing capacity. They were designated as category 1 
states in the Mashelkar Committee report[1]. Maharashtra also 
has the largest number of sales units of all Indian States. In 
the context of the AMASA project, we selected four districts: 
Dhule, Sangli, Nagpur, and Mumbai city, thereby considering 
the diverse areas of North, South, East, and West zones of 
Maharashtra, respectively (Figure).
Study Design and Data Collection
Information about regulatory capacities was collected from 
annual reports and government documents on the websites 
of central and state-level drug regulatory agencies (CDSCO, 
Maharashtra FDA, etc) and of ministries and related 
departments. Web-based searches of the main Maharashtra 
newspapers and a search of the archives of Pharmabiz, an 
online pharmaceuticals information service, focussed on 
information related to the shortage of drug inspectors, its 
causes and implications. Information about the number of 
manufacturing and sales units, and the number of inspections 
conducted, was obtained from a hard copy of the annual 
plan of the Medical Education and Drugs Department, 
Maharashtra Government for the year 2011-2012, which was 
shared with us by one of the key informants we interviewed. 
Between November 2011 and June 2012 we conducted 26 
key informant interviews with 13 regulatory officials, 4 
district-level representatives of the Druggists and Chemists 
Association, 3 Ministry of Health and public health officials, 
3 pharmaceutical producers, and 3 civil society activists. The 
key informants were purposively selected based on their 
positions and responsibilities, and by the priority given to drug 
regulation indicated by the mandate of the organisations. The 
availability and willingness of respondents to be interviewed 
was another consideration. Researchers who conducted and 
analysed these interviews included AMASA project partner 
organizations in India, the United kingdom, and Switzerland. 
All had substantial experience with conducting qualitative 
interview methods and had backgrounds in social science, 
public health or pharmaceutical development. The key 
informant interviews were conducted in the local language 
and English using interview guides with open-ended questions 
covering topical interests in regulatory structure and capacity, 
infrastructure, workload management, and enforcement of 
regulations. The interviews were audio recorded.
Approach to Data Analysis
Global and national norms for the frequency of drug 
inspections and the strength of the drug inspector workforce 
were tabulated for comparison with Indian norms, based on 
the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and Rules. 
Documentary sources were analysed and tabulated to compare 
the number of manufacturing and sales units, and, where data 
were available, indicators of the regulatory capacity for India, 
Maharashtra, and the district study sites.
The qualitative data from the key informant interviews 
were transcribed, translated and then processed using the 
qualitative data analysis software, MAXQDA version 10. 
Thematic codes were generated deductively, based on topics 
of the interview guide, to identify issues concerning the 
shortfall of inspectors according to our respondents. 
Results
Comparisons of Inspection and Workforce Norms 
Recommendations for the frequencies of drug inspections and 
the strength of the drug inspector workforce were compiled, 
and they are presented in Table 1. These recommendations 
are from reports of the World Health Organization (WHO), 
the US FDA and the Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA). Workforce planning norms of 
the Mashelkar Committee15 and the Maharashtra FDA10 have 
also been compiled.
Compared with recommendations of the global agencies, 
Indian norms require more frequent inspections – ‘not less 
than once a year.’ Until amended in September 2001, the 
requirement had been even more demanding – ‘not less than 
twice a year.’ The other global and national recommendations 
have not indicated workforce planning norms. WHO’s 
multi-country study on effective drug regulation (2002) 
acknowledged the wide international range in the number of 
units covered by drug inspectors, from a low of 45 to a high 
of 500.18
According to the Maharashtra State FDA officials and the 
State FDA Annual Action Plan Report, a drug inspector must 
inspect 10 manufacturing units per month or 21 distribution/
sales units per month. Although this is not a clear workforce 
planning norm, it can be used to estimate the number of drug 
inspectors required to inspect all manufacturing, distribution 
and sales units in the state at least once a year (Table 1). It is 
Figure. Selected Study Districts From Maharashtra, India.
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not possible to say how these norms relate to those of other 
States, because these data are not available in any report nor 
on the websites of other State FDAs (where such websites 
exist).
There is no information available to explain how the 
workforce planning norms of the Maharashtra State FDA 
were derived. The Mashelkar Committee recommendation 
of 2003 can be traced back to 1982. In June that year, a Task 
Force appointed by the Government of India recommended 
‘one drug inspector for 25 manufacturing units or 100 sales 
units.’ In August 2001, the validity of manufacture and sales 
licences was extended by the Government from 2 years to 5 
years[2]. This extension further amended the requirement of 
statutory inspections of manufacturing and sales units from 
‘not less than twice a year’ to ‘not less than once a year.’[3] 
Based on this, the Mashelkar Committee revised the earlier 
recommendation to ‘one drug inspector for 50 manufacturing 
units or 200 sales units.’15
Regulatory Capacities in Maharashtra Compared to Planning 
Norms 
Table 2 shows the number of manufacturing and sales units, 
the number of expected and actual inspections; and the 
expected, actual and sanctioned number of drug inspectors 
with reference to two norms. In 2009-2010, Maharashtra had 
a 78% and an 83% shortfall of drug inspectors in filled posts 
based on the Maharashtra FDA and Mashelkar Committee 
norms, respectively. Additionally, the number of posts that 
were actually filled (73) was 45% of sanctioned posts (161). 
In 2009-2010, the shortfall of drug inspectors in post was 
100% in Dhule, 76% in Nagpur and 89% in Sangli against 
the workforce planning norms of the Maharashtra FDA, and 
100% in Dhule, 82% in Nagpur and 92% in Sangli against the 
workforce planning norms recommended by the Mashelkar 
Committee. In 2009-2010, only 23% of the required 
inspections were actually conducted in Maharashtra; in the 
study districts it was 24% in Nagpur and 11% in Dhule and 
Sangli.
Acknowledging and Explaining the Shortage of Drug 
Inspectors
The Druggists and Chemists Association members we 
interviewed and other key informants acknowledged the 
existence of these shortfalls, confirming our analysis of 
insufficient human resources at the district level:
“For the last three years there was an insufficient number 
of drug inspectors in the district. For the first time FDA has 
enough staff, so now hopefully the work will be done properly. 
But compared to the workload, it is still not sufficient” 
(Member of Druggists and Chemists Association, April 9, 
2012).
“We have a human resource crunch, we are understaffed. We 
need 500 more drug inspectors” (Drug Regulatory Official, 
February 2, 2012).
Table 1. Recommended Frequency of Inspection and Strength of the Drug Inspector Workforce for Manufacturing and Distribution Units According to 
Authoritative Sources
Authority Manufacturing Units Distribution Units
Frequency of inspection
India: Drugs and Cosmetics Act and Rules13 (pp. 53-54) Not less than once a year Not less than once a year
WHO Once every 2 years At least once every 12-18 months
US FDA Every 2 years Every 2 years
UK (MHRA) Every 2 years Every 3 years
Drug inspector workforce strength
Mashelkar Committee15 (pp. 48-49) One drug inspector for 50 units One drug inspector for 200 units
Maharashtra State Food and Drug Regulatory Authority 
(State FDA)10 (p. A21)
10 inspections per drug inspector per month 21 inspections per drug inspector per month 
Abbreviations: WHO, World Health Organization; MHRA, Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency; FDA, Food and Drug Administration.
Table 2. Number of Manufacturing Units, Sales Units, Inspections and the Actual and Required Numbers of Inspectors in India (2011-2012) and Three Study 
Districts (Dhule, Nagpur, and Sangli) 2009-2010
No. of 
Manufacturing 
Units 
(a)
No. of Sales 
Unitsab 
(b)
Expected Inspections 
Based on Drugs and 
Cosmetics Act 
(c) = a + b
Actual Inspections 
Conducted: Actual 
(% of expected)
No. of Drug 
Inspectors: 
Appointed 
(Sanctioned)
Drug Inspectors Based 
on Maharashtra 
FDA Norm: Number 
Required (Shortfall %) 
(x) = (a/10x12) + 
(b/21x12)
Drug Inspectors Based 
on Mashelkar Committee 
Norm: Number Required
(Shortfall %) 
(y) = (a/50) + (b/200)
India (2011-
2012)2 10 563 600 000
c 610 563 Data not available 846 (1349) 2469 (NA) 3211 (74)
Maharashtra 
(2009-2010)10
1523a 80 417 81 940 19 195 (23) 73 (161) 332 (78) 433 (83)
Study districtsd (2009-2010)10
Dhule 10a 2094 2104 238 (11) 0 (NA) 8 (100) 11 (100)
Nagpur 95a 4039 4134 1010 (24) 4 (6) 17 (76) 22 (82)
Sangli 32a 2225 2257 246 (11) 1 (4) 9 (89) 12 (92)
Abbreviations: FDA: Food and Drug Administration; NA, Information not available.
a Only allopathic units; b Sales Units – Retail and whole sale pharmacies, distributors, carrying, and forwarding units. c Estimates; d Segregated data for Mumbai 
and Mumbai city district is not available.
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“In every district there are 3-4 posts for inspectors, but only 
one or two are actually filled” (Drug Inspector, January 17, 
2012).
We asked key informants why sanctioned posts were not 
filled. Most of the regulatory officials were of the opinion 
that the availability of qualified and skilled human resources 
was not a barrier. On the contrary, they explained, there were 
ample training facilities for pharmaceutical education in 
Maharashtra: 
“In Maharashtra good quality human resource is available. 
There are 407 institutes for pharmaceutical education and 
29000 students are coming out every year from Maharashtra” 
(Drug Regulatory Official, February 2, 2012).
Respondents indicated concerns about the failure of those 
responsible for filling the posts to consider the relevant 
experience of those who better understood the needs. They 
told us that regulatory officials are not involved at any stage in 
the recruitment process conducted by the Maharashtra Public 
Service Commission19:[4]
“In Maharashtra 80 posts were vacant, and it took them 5 
years to fill in those posts. So it is not that the government 
had not sanctioned the post. It is the way the public service 
commission operates; their selection was challenged, and 
finally the officers are appointed” (Retired Drug Regulatory 
Official, February 24, 2012).
Evidence from newspaper and Pharmabiz accounts indicates 
that there are a large number of applicants for positions of 
drug inspector. These sources also report that dissatisfied 
applicants often filed court cases when their applications were 
unsuccessful. These accounts show there was no shortage of 
applicants. Respondents explained that sanctioned posts 
remained unfilled because of a shortage of funds available 
to the state FDA, and a long and cumbersome recruitment 
process. Respondents at all levels were also of the opinion that 
there were no issues relating to retention of drug inspectors. 
Most thought that turnover rates were low (although they 
could not provide figures) and that staff were content with 
their compensation. Pay bands were adjusted every 5 years by 
the Pay Commission on the recommendation of the Central 
Pay Commission. Some key informants, however, suggested 
that lack of promotion was a problem. Most appointees who 
join as drug inspectors retire with the same designation or 
with only one grade of promotion over the course of their 
service. 
Implications and Concerns About the Shortage of Drug 
Inspectors
One of the high-level regulatory officials as well as several 
district level officials admitted that they were non-compliant 
with the regulations, acknowledging that they could only 
complete 25% of the inspections of units required annually 
in Maharashtra:
“There are at least 75000 distribution and retail units and 
1090 manufacturing units. Every unit must be inspected 
once in a year but it is not possible every time. Only about 
25% of the distribution and retail units are inspected as 
frequently as ‘once in a year’” (Drug Regulatory Official, 
February 2, 2012).
To manage the workload, drug regulatory agencies at central 
and state levels implemented various strategies, such as 
special drives focusing on certain priorities. In such efforts 
to catch up, inspectors would not undertake a comprehensive 
inspection. They would focus instead on one or more selected 
issues, such as the availability of qualified pharmacists, the 
availability of specific medicines, storage conditions and stock 
management, so that they could cover more pharmacies. 
Producers argued that Indian pharmaceutical companies 
would conform to self-regulation, because the confidence 
and faith of customers has substantial impact in a competitive 
market. Producers said that GMP certification based on the 
regularity of robust inspections is rigorous. They recognised 
the possibility that inspections might be unannounced:
“I want to make sure that drugs have adequate potency 
and efficacy when we manufacture and send them to the 
market. Because once you get a bad name, it is very difficult 
to get back the confidence of your customers. Now Indian 
companies are exporting to highly regulated markets. No 
manufacturer in his or her right mind really wants to be 
faulted in any way. Now many plants in India are approved 
by US FDA or EU’s EMA. Now US FDA has an office in 
New Delhi. They can come and check within 24 hours. You 
can’t afford to have deficiency in any way. You have to be 
compliant with all the procedures and processes and so on” 
(Pharmaceutical Producer, November 15, 2011).
Regulatory officials also reported that they focus more on 
those manufacturers who have a history of poor compliance:
“Drug inspectors know which manufacturers have a good 
compliance record and those who are not having good 
compliance records. Those who are very good in self-
regulation and very punctual and keen about compliance are 
not focused on by the Drug Inspectors” (Drug Regulatory 
Official, February 2, 2012).
The need for planning to cope with the proposed expansion of 
the capacity for testing samples in drug regulatory laboratories 
in Maharashtra was also recognized. Key regulatory officials 
reported that in Maharashtra, the two state-level laboratories–
one in Mumbai and the other in Aurangabad–had the capacity 
to test 8000 samples per year, which amounts to almost 20% 
of India’s capacity. A senior official reported that Maharashtra 
had proposed scaling up its drug testing capacity tenfold, 
from 8000 to 80 000 samples per year. This is almost double 
the country’s current sample testing capacity. However, such 
aims to expand capacity for drug testing in new laboratories 
imply a complementary obligation to increase the number 
of drug inspectors. None of the respondents provided any 
indication of coordinated planning for that. 
Members of the Druggists and Chemists Association in 
Maharashtra said that, despite issues related to a few stringent 
regulations, the association cooperates effectively with the 
state FDA to tackle issues related to substandard and spurious 
medicines, drug recalls and inspections:
“FDA does not trouble unnecessarily, but if the member 
is found non-compliant then FDA takes actions. The 
Association also does not support anyone who is doing 
wrong practices. We have a strong network of our members, 
which helps us in restricting entry of spurious drugs in our 
market and also during drug recalls” (Member of Druggists 
and Chemists Association, April 9, 2012).
Not surprisingly, in view of the accusations that have been 
leveled at Indian companies, producers reported that 
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inspections were carried out with great efficiency:
“The GMP inspections are very rigorous. They check 
whether we are compliant with so many requirements; they 
really want a proof whether we have done it. If they are not 
satisfied, they do not give approval. The regular inspections 
are unannounced or surprise inspections” (Pharmaceutical 
Producer, November 15, 2011).
However, drug inspectors noted one barrier to effective 
inspections of distribution sites – the absence of a code of 
good distribution practices (GDP):
“Good distribution practices are not codified in India. You 
have licensing requirements wherein it would be specified 
as to how you deal with medicines, how you purchase, how 
you store, how you sell. That is a statutory requirement. But 
internationally, good storage practices and good distribution 
practices form part of either guidelines or the regulations. 
That is not the case under the drugs rules here” (Retired 
Drug Regulatory Official, February 24, 2012).
“There are two aspects, one is warehousing and the second 
one is transport. GDP is responsible for storage and not 
transportation. We call them wholesale licenses; whether he 
is a carrying and forwarding (C&F) agent or a big distributor 
or a small distributor or a wholesaler, and once a year we do 
the inspection for most of them” (Drug inspector, January 
17, 2012).
Discussion 
This is the first study to identify the magnitude and examine 
the reasons for the shortfall of drug inspectors in the state 
of Maharashtra and in selected districts. Maharashtra 
has struggled to recruit the sanctioned 161 posts of drug 
inspectors. Though availability of skilled human resource was 
not perceived as a major problem in Maharashtra, delay in 
recruitment, court challenges, a slow recruitment process and 
lack of career opportunities were described as reasons for the 
continuing failure to reach the desired standards. 
Despite the long list of job responsibilities of drug inspectors,13 
both the State and Central governments are now expanding 
the role and increasing the workload of drug inspectors. For 
example, in addition to their current tasks, the CDSCO has 
proposed that drug inspectors will also inspect clinical trial 
sites once a year.20 Expanded capacity for lab testing will 
further add to drug inspectors’ workloads. They will receive 
reports more quickly, and they will be expected to follow up 
on more samples collected during inspections. 
The Mashelkar Committee noted that India has well-drafted 
legislation, which is in line with recommendations of the 
WHO 2002 multi-country study for effective regulations, but 
that its enforcement at several levels has been inconsistent 
because of the multiplicity and the variable quality of the 
enforcement authorities.15 The WHO study recommended 
a single countrywide agency to prevent fragmentation and 
uncoordinated delegation of powers that impede regulatory 
effectiveness.15,18
Since 1975 several committees and reports have 
recommended establishing a National Drug Authority 
(NDA).14,15 The Pharmaceutical Research and Development 
Committee (1999) and Drug Policy (2002), as well as the 
Mashelkar Committee, all recommended the comprehensive 
strengthening of the CDSCO as an alternative to a new NDA.15 
This recommendation has still not been implemented,2,17 
however, nor has an NDA been established. 
The gap remains between national statutory provisions for 
inspection and workforce planning norms. One solution is to 
put in place primary legislation, the Act, to provide that both 
Central and State authorities shall have the ‘duty’ to appoint a 
sufficient number of qualified inspectors who shall be given 
such powers and duties as are necessary for ensuring that 
the Central and State authorities are able to perform their 
respective functions effectively under the Act. 
The Government of India, in its secondary legislation, the 
Rules, should then prescribe norms for calculating the 
number of such inspectors at the level necessary for ensuring 
effective performance. Inspection norms need to be separately 
provided under a new Rule.13 These Rules should also include 
provisions for reassessing inspection norms to account for 
growth and increasing complexity of the pharmaceutical 
industry and for future expansion of role of drug inspectors 
(eg, inspection of clinical trial sites).
Greater transparency in the functioning of the drug regulatory 
authorities is essential. The support of WHO and international 
agencies in strengthening the public regulation system and in 
the inspection of the indigenous pharmaceutical industry is 
crucial for the interests of safer and efficacious medicines for 
India and for its prospects in international trade. Failure to 
achieve a better regulatory capacity on a country-wide basis 
is likely to jeopardize the health of Indian citizens and could 
also trigger an international ban on medicines manufactured 
in India under the public health protection sections of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or technical 
barriers to trade (TBT) agreements. Consequently, a central 
database needs to be created and made available in the public 
domain in order to enable public scrutiny of the work of the 
regulatory agencies.
Recommendations 
•	 The Government of India should constitute a committee, 
with a clear process and timeline, to develop ‘workforce 
planning norms’ based on the recommendations of the 
Mashelkar Committee and global standards, and to 
consider whether primary legislation and Rule changes 
are required.
•	 This committee should assess the implementation 
status of recommendations by these various previous 
committees.
•	 This committee should promote, support and assess 
initiatives to create a central as well as state-level 
databases, and work to make them available in the public 
domain.
Conclusion
A strong inspectorate is a crucial part of an overall drug regulatory 
system. It is an indicator of the rigour and competence of the 
regulatory body in fulfilling its responsibilities for oversight 
of the manufacturing and marketing of pharmaceuticals. To 
achieve this goal, the Government of India needs to assess 
urgently the implementation status of recommendations of 
the various committees that have reported on this topic in the 
past 15 years. It needs to ensure that global standards are in 
place and to make reliable information available in the public 
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domain. 
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Endnotes
[1] Category 1 states include Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, West Bengal, and Goa (Mashelkar Committee report, 
2003).
[2] Subs. by G.S.R 601 (E), dt. 24-8-2001.
[3] Subs. by G.S.R. 700 (E), dt. 28-9-2001.
[4] Such court challenges not only delay the appointment of drug inspectors 
but also higher level officials in India. The appointment of the Drugs Controller 
General India was also delayed in this way (see  reference 19).
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